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BOARD STRUCTURE AND MODIFIED AUDIT OPINIONS: THE CASE OF 




Prior research has found evidence that some characteristics of the board of 
directors influence the quality of accounting information (e.g., Beasley, 1996; 
Dechow et al., 1996; Klein, 2002a; Xie et al., 2003). In this study we extend 
the  literature  by  analysing  a  different  dimension  of  accounting  information 
quality, the probability of a firm receiving a modified audit opinion. Using a 
sample  of  companies  listed  on  Euronext  Lisbon  where  firms  can  publish 
financial statements not in accordance with GAAP, unlike the current situation 
in  other markets like  the US,  and  91 firm-year observations for  the  period 
2002-03,  we  find  evidence  consistent  with  the  hypotheses  that  board 
diligence  and  independence  contribute  negatively  to  the  probability  of  a 
modified opinion, while board size is not statistically significant. Our results 
are  robust  to  different  specifications  and  also  show  that  financial  health, 
performance,  growth  opportunities and the  existence of dividend  payments 
are additional factors affecting the likelihood of a modified audit opinion.  
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1. Introduction 
Accounting can be regarded as an information system through which 
one would report the underlying economic reality of a particular entity. If the 
quality of the reported accounting information is low, its recipients might make 
incorrect decisions (e.g., about investment or financing) with the consequence 
that economic resources will be sub-optimally allocated. Ideally, the financial 
reporting  system  should  allow  firms  with  better  performance  to  distinguish 
themselves from less well performing ones, and in that case accounting rules 
would  create  value  by  ensuring  that  financial  reports  provide  adequate 
information on the true economic performance of an organization (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999, p. 366). However, due the to information asymmetry between 
"internal"  and  "external"  parties,  the  flexibility  that  prevails  in  the  financial 
reporting system allows a degree of discretionary power to managers, which 
can be used either opportunistically or as a way of improving communication 
by releasing private information.  
But  particularly  since  Enron' s  financial  reporting  irregularities  were 
uncovered in December, 2001, accounting scandals have gained large media 
visibility  either  in  the  US  (e.g.  Worldcom,  Xerox)  or  Europe  (e.g.,  Ahold, 
Parmalat), and catalysed the interest in the analysis of accounting quality. A 
particular concern that is the focus of our paper is the study of the factors that 
can  potentially  reduce  or  eliminate  the  likelihood  that  the  financial 
performance of a company is masked by the aggressive usage, on the part of 
managers, of the discretionary allowances prevailing in Generally Accepted 
Accounting  Principles  (GAAP),  or  even  the  deliberate  avoidance  of  those 
principles.  The  much  publicised  cases  of  irregularities  in  the  accounts 
published  by many corporations have caused  a serious concern about  the 
credibility  of  the  whole  system  of  financial  reporting,  with  the  immediate 
consequence of an abrupt fall in investors’ confidence in the reported financial 
information. This loss of confidence can refrain investors’ willingness to buy 
shares,  thus  potentially  increasing  firm' s  cost  of  capital  and  exerting  a 
negative effect on productivity for the economy as a whole (IFAC, 2003, p. 5). 
A  response  to  those  concerns  about  the  quality  of  accounting 
information has been, in normative terms, and as a direct consequence of the   4 
recent  accounting scandals, the  “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”, issued in the US in 
July 2002 with the purpose of increasing the level of investors'  protection, and 
improving the truthfulness, scope and reliability of the accounting information 
released by companies (Klein, 2003). 
Auditors have a particularly important role in monitoring the quality of 
the financial statements published by firms. In fact, financial reports can be 
seen  as  a  joint  product  of  managers  and  auditors,  involving  negotiations 
between  these  two  parties  about  the  accounting  treatment  of  particular 
situations, with an interaction between the context and the negotiation. Such 
negotiated process will usually lead to a compromise between managers and 
auditors  as  it  is  mutually  beneficial  that  the  auditor  issues  an  unqualified 
opinion so as to avoid public attention, particularly from regulators (Gibbins et 
al., 2001; Nelson et al., 2002).  
Previous research (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002a; Xie et al., 2003) 
has shown that board characteristics have an important impact on the quality 
of accounting information. Our paper’s major contribution to this literature is to 
confirm such conclusions using the auditors'  opinion as a different dimension 
of accounting quality, a feature which is, to our best knowledge, a novelty in 
this context. The Portuguese Exchange is an interesting environment to test 
such relationship given that, unlike currently major markets like the US, listed 
companies in Euronext Lisbon are not required to file financial statements in 
compliance  with  GAAP.  In  addition,  our  paper  extends  the  literature  on 
accounting information quality and, in more general terms, the monitoring role 
of non-executive directors, by analysing such issues in an emerging market 
environment for which little research is available. 
Our results show that, consistent with the importance of a monitoring 
role by non-executive directors, board of directors'  diligence (proxied by the 
presence  of an  executive committee)  and independence (measured  by  the 
proportion  of  non-executive  members)  have  a  negative  impact  on  the 
likelihood of the auditor issuing a modified opinion. We also find evidence that 
the firm' s financial health, performance, investment opportunities and dividend 
payments all have a negative impact on the probability of a modified opinion 
from auditors.    5 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature that has analysed the links between the board of directors, auditors 
and accounting quality. Section 3 presents the hypotheses to be tested and 
the  methodology  used.  Section  4  describes  the  sampling  procedures  and 
sample characteristics. Section 5 presents and discusses the major results. 
Section 6 provides a number of robustness checks to the results. The final 
section concludes and summarizes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1. Board of Directors 
In recent papers (e.g., Klein, 2002a; Xie et al., 2003) researchers have 
established  links  between  the  Board  of  Directors'   structure  and  earnings 
manipulation  activities.  The  existing  studies  have  suggested  that  board 
characteristics like size, power concentration, the existence of a dominating 
individual,  the  presence  of  audit  committees  with  certain  features,  the 
proportion  of  non-executive  and  independent  ("external")  members,  the 
number  of  meetings  and  technical  competence  have  an  influence  on 
accounting  information  quality.  This  is  usually  proxied  by  discretionary,  or 
abnormal, accruals estimated using accrual-based accounting models (e.g., 
Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Peasnell et al., 2000a). 
Beasley (1996) tested the hypothesis that a larger proportion of non-
executive board members reduce the probability of accounting fraud, having 
obtained evidence consistent with this assertion.  
Klein  (2002a)  observed  the  existence  of  a  negative  relationship 
between the  presence of an independent board members majority and the 
occurrence of earnings management activities.  
Peasnell  et  al.  (2004)  found  evidence  that  the  proportion  of  non-
executive members is a positive influence on the integrity of firms'  financial 
reporting. Nonetheless, the results show that such board members influence 
income-increasing  earnings  management  activities  but  not  income-
decreasing. This evidence is consistent with the argument that personal costs   6 
are higher if a firm is identified as having artificially inflated reported earnings 
as compared to a situation where the effect was to reduce profits.  
Regarding  the  risk  of  an  excessive  power  concentration,  it  is 
internationally  recommended  (e.g.,  FRC,  2003;  OECD,  2004)  that  a 
separation is made between the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) as a necessary condition for the monitoring and management roles to 
be articulated in a simultaneous and efficient way. By separating those two 
functions, one might also avoid the existence of excessive power in the hands 
of a single individual within an organization.  
Dechow  et  al.  (1996)  report  that  firms  identified  by  the  SEC  as 
earnings-manipulators  usually  have  a  corporate  governance  structure 
characterized  by  executive  directors  dominating  the  Board,  Chairmen  that 
simultaneously act as CEOs, and are unlikely to have an audit committee.  
The creation of an audit committee within the Board of Directors with a 
particular set of characteristics can potentially lead to better financial reporting 
quality. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find evidence that the likelihood of an 
income restatement is lower if an independent member is present in the audit 
committee with accounting or finance professional expertise. In a sample of 
financially distressed companies, Carcello and Neal (2000) report that a larger 
proportion  of  non-independent  members  in  the  Audit  committee  leads  to  a 
lower  probability  that  the  auditor  will  issue  a  modified  opinion  expressing 
going-concern worries, lending support to the argument that such committees 
might  sometimes  suffer  from  lack  of  independence.  Regarding  the  way 
members  of  the  audit  committee  interact  with  external  auditors  in  settling 
disagreements  over  certain  accounting  options,  the  results  reported  by 
DeZoort  and  Salterio  (2001)  suggest  that  increased  audit  committee 
members’  independence  and  audit-reporting  knowledge  are  positively 
associated  with  auditor  support  in  an  auditor-management  dispute. 
Conversely,  concurrent  board  and  management  experience  result  in  less 
support for the auditor.  
Two further empirical studies show, however, that the existence of an 
audit committee does not necessarily lead to better financial reporting quality. 
In fact, Peasnell et al. (2004) do not find evidence that the presence of an 
audit  committee  reduces  the  level  of  either  income-increasing  or  income–  7 
reducing  earnings  management.  Similarly,  Beasley  (1996)  reports  that  the 
existence of an audit committee does not reduce the likelihood of accounting 
fraud. A limitation, however, of the results in these papers is that no in-depth 
analysis  was  made  on  the  characteristics  of  the  audit  committees,  as  the 
papers only take into account whether a particular firm has an audit committee 
or not.    
Another  aspect  which  has  been  analyzed  in  the  literature  is  the 
relationship  between  earnings  management  practices  and  board 
characteristics such as size, diligence and technical competence.   
Regarding the issue of board size, it is clearly difficult, if not impossible, 
to  determine  an  optimal  number  of  board  members.  One  might  argue, 
however,  that  an  optimal  board  size  should  be  the  result  of  an  adequate 
balance between professional qualification and relevant business experience 
of its members. Beasley (1996) reports a positive association between board 
size and the likelihood of an accounting fraud, while Xie et al. (2003) find, in 
contrast, evidence consistent with a negative relationship between the number 
of board members and the presence of earnings management. 
If a board meets often, this might be interpreted as a signal that an 
active  monitoring  is  taking  place,  but  one  might  also  argue  that  this  could 
simply be the result of weak performance (Vafeas, 1999).  
Xie et al. (2003) show that member with previous or contemporaneous 
experience as directors in other firms’ boards or in the financial industry have 
a negative influence on the level of earnings management, and this is also the 
case with the number of board meetings.  
 
2.2. External auditors 
Auditors  issue  their  opinions  over  a  complete  set  of  financial 
statements
1,  based  on  the  auditing  procedures  made  and  taking  into 
consideration a particular financial reporting reference set (e.g., Portuguese 
GAAP).  The  auditor’s  opinion,  as  presented  in  its  report  on  the  financial 
statements, is useful for the users of such financial information as these can 
                                                       
1 In Portugal these are the balance sheet, profit and loss account, income statement by nature 
and function, cash-flows statement, and notes to the accounts (DRA-Directriz de Revisão de 
Auditoria 700, Portuguese Auditing Standard 700).   8 
better judge the “the true and fair view in all materially relevant aspects” of 
published  statements.  Apart  from  being  more  credible,  such  financial 
information  will  be  more  easily  understood  when  jointly  analyzed  with  the 
auditor’s opinion.  
Auditing  reduces  information  asymmetries  between  managers  and 
stakeholders  and  it  can  act  as  a  monitoring  device  by  which  financial 
information distortions created by management can be reduced (Kinney and 
Martin, 1994). Auditors communicate with stakeholders through their opinion 
as expressed in the auditing report with the consequence that agency costs 
can be reduced when independent auditors are hired (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  
A regular auditing should be undertaken by an independent, qualified 
and technically competent auditor so as to ensure that, to both the board and 
shareholders, published financial statements are a true and fair representation 
of  the  financial  position  and  performance  of  the  entity  concerned  in  all 
materially relevant aspects (OECD, 2004, p. 22). 
From the standpoint of information users, modified audit reports can be 
interpreted as a signal of lower quality of the financial information provided. 
However, it is not the role of the auditor to issue an opinion about the quality 
of reported income, but simply whether it conforms to GAAP or not (Bradshaw 
et al., 2001).  
In comparison with lower quality ones, high quality auditors are more 
likely  to  detect  questionable  accounting  options  and  to  communicate  their 
existence by issuing a qualified opinion (if managers do not make the required 
accounting  adjustments).  In  Portugal  modified  opinions  can  contain  either 
auditing “qualifications” or “emphases”, as will be explained later. Audit quality 
will depend to a large extent on the auditor’s independence.  
The independence of the auditor is in fact a requirement without which 
audit quality will be seriously affected. Audit quality can be defined as the joint 
probability  of  detecting  and  reporting  materially  significant  accounting 
distortions (contingent on their existence). As such, audit quality will depend 
on  the  ability  of  the  auditor  to  issue  a  modified  opinion  when  accounting 
distortions exist and managers are not willing to incorporate the accounting 
adjustments suggested by auditors. Such independence will be perfect when   9 
the probability of reporting a relevant existing accounting distortion is equal to 
one (DeAngelo, 1981).  
Payment  of  non-audit  fees  and  client  size  are  variables  which  have 
been tested in the literature as factors that could potentially affect auditor’s 
independence. However, in this regard the  reported  evidence is  somewhat 
mixed (e.g., Reynolds and Francis, 2001; Defond et al., 2002; Frankel et al., 
2002; Nelson et al., 2002).  
A darker perspective is that which argues that full audit independence 
will  never  be  possible  if the  auditor is  paid by the company  being audited 
(IFAC, 2003, p. 13). 
In the literature a number of studies also exist that seek to analyze the 
relationship  between  the  quality  of  published  financial  statements  and  the 
characteristics of the firm’s auditors. In particular, studies have been made to 
assess whether any differences arise when audits are carried out by any of 
the largest auditing companies
2.  In Becker et al. (1998) study, evidence  is 
found that those companies that hired any of the so-called Big 4 auditors on 
average report lower discretionary accruals than firms that hired other auditing 
firms. The choice of one of the largest auditors (Big 4) can also be used by the 
firm as a vehicle for signalling a better quality of its financial information as 
external  parties  will  perceive  higher  credibility  in  the  information  provided 
when  this  was  audited  by  any  of  the  Big  4.  However,  recent  accounting 
scandals  which  have  involved  some  of  the  major  auditing  firms  may  have 
seriously affected such perception.   
Francis et al. (1999) predict that firms showing a greater endogenous 
propensity
3 to generate accruals will be more likely to hire one of the Big 4 
and  that  companies  audited  by  any  of  these  will  have  lower  discretionary 
accruals, that is, lower earnings management activities, the resulting financial 
information enjoying an overall better  perceived quality. Heninger (2001, p. 
117) reports evidence that the Big 4 have a lower probability of being sued 
                                                       
2 With the collapse of Andersen as the result of its involvement in the Enron scandal, there are 
currently  four  large  international  audit  firms.  Therefore,  for  text  simplification  purposes, 
every time the term Big 4 is used this means that this relates to one of those firms, although 
the literature has used in the past terms like Big 8, Big 6 or Big 5. 
3 This is related to the duration of its operating cycle and the intensity of its investment in 
fixed assets.   10 
than other auditors, which can be interpreted as consistent with the view that 
their auditing work is of higher quality. 
Francis and Krishnan (1999) show that the Big 4 are more conservative 
than other auditors given that, for a given high level of accruals the probability 
is  higher  that  a  modified  opinion  will  be  issued.  This  suggests  that  these 
auditors  interpret  the  existence  of  a  high  level  of  accruals  as  more  risky, 
leading auditors to issue a modified opinion in order to signal to third parties 
the existence of potential problems which may affect the value of assets and 
the continuity of the firm’s operations.  
Somewhat in contrast with the evidence mentioned above, Dechow et 
al. (1996, p. 21) do not find significant relationship between the fact that a firm 
has been audited by one of the largest auditing firms and its characterization 
as an earnings manipulator. In fact, the authors report that the auditor type is 
not statistically different between the two kinds of firms (earnings manipulators 
or not).  
Another  issue  which  has  been  studied  in  the  literature  relates  to 
corporate governance concerns. Some authors take the perspective that an 
auditor should evaluate the corporate governance structure of its clients and 
incorporate such evaluation in their auditing planning and in the associated 
risk. The reasoning is that an inappropriate governance structure might be a 
risk  factor  for  the  auditor  and  even  sometimes  a  reason  for  refusing  a 
particular risky client (Cohen e Hanno, 2000; Cohen et al., 2002; Bedard e 
Johnstone, 2004). 
3. Research hypotheses and methodology  
In figure 1 the major literature framework for our study on accounting is 
summarized  with  the  emphasis  being  made  on  the  relationship  between 
accounting information quality and board characteristics.  
We  view  the  issuance  of  a  modified  opinion  by  an  auditor  as  a 
symptom of lower information quality. A “clean” opinion will be that which is 
clear from any audit qualifications or emphases, or with emphases which can 
be viewed as unrelated to fundamental uncertainties as will be clarified later. 
In practical terms, we shall consider as a modified audit opinion the following 
cases:   11 
·  A qualified opinion was issued as the result of a disagreement 
with  management  or  limitation  on  the  scope  of  the  auditor’s 
work. 
·  An  opinion  where  emphases  were  made  regarding  the 
applicability  of  the  going-concern  principle  or  material 
uncertainties  regarding  the  realization  value  of  assets  or 
contingent  liabilities  (e.g.,  legal  actions  taking  place).  The 
reason why we consider such emphases as corresponding to 
fundamental uncertainties is due to the fact that these relate to 
issues  whose  outcome  depends  of  future  actions  or  events 
which  are  not  controllable  by  the  company,  but  which 
nonetheless  might  seriously  affect  the  reported  accounting 
figures. In addition, by including those emphases, the auditor is 
conveying his view that, according to his professional judgment, 
these  are  materially  relevant
4.  As  an  illustration,  this  kind  of 
                                                       
4 For an example of a going-concern opinion we reproduce the audit emphasis contained in 
Lisgráfica’s audit report (2002): 
“…the  value  of  current  assets  is  lower  that  short  term  liabilities.  As  mentioned  in  the 
Management’s Report, the board of directors has taken several measures, and plans to take 
additional ones in the near future, in order to tackle the current situation. The continuity of the 
firm’s activities will depend of the success of these steps and the future profitability of the 
firm’s operations”.  
Regarding the material uncertainties related to the realization value of assets, we quote the 
following emphasis published in Grão Pará’s report (2003): 
“A number of significant old balances remain unsettled, totaling 5.063.000 Euros, concerning 
costs  incurred  with  land  preparation  works,  studies  and  architectural  plans  of  real  estate 
projects to be developed by the subsidiaries Matur, S.A. and Autodril, Sociedade Imobiliária 
S.A. The recovering if such costs will depend on the realization of a number of corporate 
actions that it is hoped will enable the conditions to generate income for the Group, namely 
the divestment of non-crucial assets and the actual development of the associated real estate 
projects” 
As an example of emphases related to contingent liabilities, an example is that contained in 
Gescartão’ report  (2003): 
“As mentioned in Note 38 to the accounts, Portucel Viana—Empresa Produtora de Papéis 
Industriais, SA, was notified by tax authorities in 2002 to make an additional IRC (Portuguese 
corporation tax) payment in the amount of approximately 2.470.000 Euros. In addition, in the 
year 2003, Portucel Embalagem—Empresa Produtora de Embalagens de Cartão, SA was also 
notified by tax authorities to correct its IRC taxable income by the amount of approximately 
7.400.000  Euros.  The  board  of  directors  of  those  subsidiaries  believes  that  the  reasoning 
brought forward by the tax authorities violates Portuguese fiscal laws so that a recourse was 
undertaken regarding the first notification and the same procedure shall be taken in due time 
for the second one as soon as the corresponding additional taxes are disclosed by the IRC 
services.  The  company  made  no  provisions  in  its  accounts  for  the  possibility  of  an   12 
emphases, before the issuance, in the US, of the Statement of 
Auditing Standards 58, automatically led to a qualified opinion 
(Butler  et  al.,  2004,  p.  144).  In  Portugal,  according  to  Costa 
(2000, pp. 571-572), the existence of such uncertainties should 
also lead to the issuance of a qualified opinion.   
A smaller board can arguably perform better its role of supervising the 
preparation  of  financial  statements  given  that  it  should  suffer  from  fewer 
bureaucratic problems and be more functional. On the other hand, a larger 
one may imply the existence of larger set of business competencies, namely 
in  the  form  of  independent  and  experienced  members  with  adequate 
accounting training or knowledge. This might therefore lead to better financial 
information quality (Xie et al., 2003, p. 300). 
Beasley  (1996)  finds  a  positive  relationship  between  the  number  of 
board members and the probability of accounting fraud, while Xie et al. (2003) 
document, in contrast, results which are consistent with board size exerting a 
negative  impact  on  earnings  management  activities.  Therefore,  board  size 
(NUM) can be an important influence on the probability that a modified opinion 
is issued by the auditor, but with no particular expected sign. This leads us to 
our first hypothesis:   
 
H1:  Board  size  (NUM)  has  a  significant  impact  (which  can  be  either 
negative or positive) on the probability that the auditor issues a modified 
opinion, all else constant. 
 
Board  diligence  is  related  to  factors  that  include  the  number  of 
meetings and its members’ qualifications (Carcello et al., 2002, p. 371). Using 
the number of meetings as a proxy to characterize board diligence, Xie et al 
(2003, p. 304) find a negative relationship between such variable and the level 
of current discretionary accruals. 
                                                                                                                                                         
unfavorable outcome of these tax situations, which, at this time, is uncertain, nor for any 
similar situations in the future. “  
 
   13 
The  number  of  board  meetings  (MEET)  and  the  existence  of  an 
executive committee (EC) are variables whose aim is to capture the impact of 
board diligence on the auditor’s opinion. A more diligent board will conceivably 
be  more  concerned  with  supervising  the  financial  information  production 
process and therefore devote to such task more of its time and attention. The 
expected  sign  for  these  variables  is  negative,  given  that  a  higher  level  of 
board  diligence  should  reduce  the  probability  of  a  modified  opinion  being 
issued. Our second hypothesis is therefore: 
 
H2: Board diligence (as proxied by MEET and EC) has a negative impact 
on  the  probability  of  a  firm  receiving  a  modified  opinion,  all  else 
constant. 
 
The proportion of non-executive members in the board (PNEXEC) and 
the existence of a CEO-Chairman dual-role (DUAL) are variables that seek to 
measure  the  degree  of  board  independence.  Along  those  lines,  one  can 
assume that a larger proportion of non-executive members or the inexistence 
of  duality  should  lead  to  greater  board  independence.  The  literature  has 
shown evidence that these factors are related to better financial information 
quality (e.g., Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Klein, 2002a), so that it is 
reasonable to expect a negative relationship between these variables and the 
likelihood that a firm will be issued a modified opinion. This takes us to our 
third research hypothesis:  
 
H3:  Board  independence  (as  proxied  by  PNEXEC  and  DUAL)  is  a 
negative  influence  on  the  probability  that  a  firm  is  issued  a  modified 
opinion, all else constant.  
 
In order for our hypotheses to be tested, we use the following logistic 
regression  that  models  the  likelihood  that  the  auditor  will  issue  a  modified 
opinion:  
   14 
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The auditors’ opinion (OPIN) will take the value of 1 if the opinion is a 
modified  one,  i.e.,  a  qualification  or  an  emphasis  associated  with  a 
fundamental uncertainty expressed by the auditor regarding the applicability of 
the on-going concern principle or the realization value of assets or contingent 
liabilities has been issued by the auditor, and 0 otherwise.  
The independent variables are defined as follows: 
NUM  =  Number of board members at year-end; 
MEET  =  Number of board meetings during the year; 
EC  =  1, if  an executive committee is reported  at  year-end,  0 in  the 
opposite case; 
PNEXEC  =  Proportion of non-executive members in the board; 
DUAL  =  1, if the Chairman of the board is also the CEO, 0 in the opposite 
case; 
LASSETS  =  Log of total assets. Assets are measured at year-end and are 
expressed in thousands of euros;   
LOSS  =  1, if the company reports a negative net income at least in the 
last two years, 0 if not; 
ER  =  Equity  ratio,  computed  as  the  ratio  between  book  equity  and 
total assets; 
ROA  =  Operating  profitability.  This  is  computed  as  the  ratio  between 
earnings  before  interest,  taxes  and  extraordinary  income  and 
total assets; 
PBV  =  Price  book  value.  This  is  the  market  value  of  a  firm’s  equity 
(MKCAP) divided by book equity at year-end
5. 
 
                                                       
5 Market capitalization (MKCAP) was computed by multiplying the firm’s stock price as of 
31 December by the number of outstanding shares. When such information was not available 
in company reports, we collected the missing data using Euronext Lisbon’s DATHIS—Base 
de Dados Histórica (version 4.13.) database. For a few companies–those with lower liquidity 
(e.g., listed in the Second Market)–when stock prices were not available as of 31 December, 
the last known quote was used and collected from DATHIS.    15 
In  our  model  we  also  introduced  a  number  of  control  variables 
designed  to  account  for  other  influences  which  have  been  reported  in  the 
literature that can impact on the probability that a firm is issued a modified 
opinion. These are associated to firm characteristics like size, financial health, 
profitability and expected growth (e.g., Bartov et al., 2000; Bradshaw et al., 
2001; Nelson et al., 2002; Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2004). 
The  log of  total  assets (LASSETS) seeks to control the influence of 
client size. This might affect the nature of an auditor’s opinion as client size 
can  create  an  economic dependence that  can reduce  the likelihood  that  a 
modified  opinion  is  issued  (e.g.,  Nelson  et  al.,  2002).  On  the  other  hand, 
Reynolds and Francis (2001) find evidence that a more conservative posture 
by auditors is associated with larger clients, suggesting that given the greater 
litigation risk of such clients, the auditor will be concerned about protecting his 
reputation  and  may  therefore  be  more  cautious.  Accordingly  we  leave  the 
expected sign as an open question. 
The  LOSS  variable  aims  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  if  a  company 
reports consecutive losses this will be likely to have an impact on the auditor’s 
opinion.  As  with  the  ER  (equity-to-assets  ratio)  variable,  the  purpose  is  to 
capture  the  financial  health  of  the  auditor’s  client.  Companies  that  report 
consecutive  losses  or  which  have  a  low  equity-to-assets  ratio  will  be 
characterized  by  greater  financial  risks  and  even  its  going-concern 
assumption  might  sometimes  be  at  stake.  Under  those  circumstances,  the 
firms might engage in aggressive accounting practices that could reduce the 
visibility of those risks or avoid the violation of debt covenants (e.g., Defond e 
Jiambalvo, 1994). In addition, if those companies bring greater litigation risks 
to auditors (e.g., Heninger, 2001), greater care will be put into the auditing 
process  so  that  the  auditor  will  be  more  likely  to  issue  a  modified  opinion 
regarding any aggressive accounting practices or going-concern risks. 
In accordance with the above hypothesis, Bartov (2000) finds evidence 
that companies being issued qualified opinions are typically characterized by 
higher long-term debt ratios than firms with “clean” opinions.  
We therefore expect that financial health indicators will have a negative 
impact on the probability that a firm is issued a modified opinion so that in our 
model a positive sign is expected for LOSS and a negative one for ER.   16 
Asset profitability (ROA) is introduced in our model also to capture firm 
performance as an additional control factor. All else constant, one will expect 
that  a  larger ROA  will lead to  a  lower probability of a firm being issued a 
modified opinion as the result of greater earnings persistence (Sloan, 1996) 
and a low-risk evaluation by the auditor. In accordance with this, Bradshaw et 
al.  (2001)  document  the  existence  of  a  negative  relationship  between 
performance and the probability of a modified opinion, this last variable being 
defined in the same way as we do in our paper.  
Growth opportunities may also influence the auditor’s opinion. A high 
price  book  value  (PBV)  might  indicate  that  the  company  faces  growth 
opportunities or expects increased profitability in the future.  Such companies 
will tend to have a greater propensity to issue new shares as the result of the 
larger premium that the market places over their book value of equity. This 
may  increase  the  desirability  of  non-modified  opinions  in  order  to  avoid  a 
negative image of the firm so as to facilitate fund raising in primary capital 
markets to feed its growth opportunities.  
On the other hand, firms with greater growth opportunities will be more 
interested  in  reaching  certain  performance  benchmarks  in  order  to  meet 
analyst’s  expectations  and  avoid  low  profits  or  even  losses  that  could 
seriously  damage  the  firm’s  stock  price  (Skinner  and  Sloan,  2002).  In  a 
sample of firms that did not follow GAAP, Dechow et al. (1996, table 6) find a 
larger  price-book  value  as  compared  to  a  control  sample,  suggesting  that 
growth opportunities are related to the presence of accounting options that do 
not respect GAAP. Given the above, the a priori sign for the price-book value 
variable (PBV) could be either positive or negative.  
4. Sample selection 
One of the main purposes in this paper is to test whether board size, 
diligence  and  independence  have  an  influence  on  the  existence  of  a 
modification  in  the  auditor’s  report  on  the  consolidated  accounts  of  a 
company.  
By  choosing  the  analysis  of  consolidated  accounts  and  the 
corresponding  auditor’s  report,  we  explicitly  assume  that  consolidated 
accounts are the most useful ones to the users of financial information. This   17 
view seems to be shared by the Portuguese Exchange Commission (CMVM-
Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários), given that it has exempted a 
number of listed firms from publishing accounts on an individual basis
6. The 
information  about  such  exemption  can  be  found  in  these  firm’s  published 
consolidated accounts. 
In addition, we should mention that 25 out of a total of 46 firms in our 
sample are formally holding companies (in Portugal called SGPS-Sociedades 
Gestoras de Participações Sociais) whose sole legal purpose, according to 
the Decree-Law nr. 495/88 published in 30 December, 1988, is to “manage 
holdings  in  other  companies  as  an  indirect  way  of  running  an  economic 
activity”. Therefore, for this kind of firms it is even more clear the usefulness of 
consolidated  accounts.  One  can  also  argue  that  consolidated  accounts 
include at least as much information as individual ones and is therefore at 
least  as  useful.  The  relevance  of  consolidated  accounts  is  also  reinforced 
when  one  takes  into  account  recent  financial  scandals  where  the  firms  in 
question  took  advantage  of  relationships  with  unconsolidated  accounts  to 
engage in accounting frauds (e.g, Enron and Parmalat). Finally, one should 
stress the fact that in just three firms in our sample (Copam, Lisgráfica and 
Amieiros Verdes) did we find only unconsolidated accounts. 
The collection of data was made from published financial documents 
found  on  the  information  diffusion  system  of  CMVM  in  this  commissions’ 
website
7. Information gathered from other sources will be detailed later in this 
paper. 
According  to  CMVM  regulation  nr.  7/2001,  and  further  changes 
introduced by regulation nr. 11/2003 (from this point forward referred to simply 
as CMVM 7/2001), listed firms subject to the Portuguese Law must publish a 
report  detailing  information  on  corporate  governance  issues  as  defined  by 
CMVM
8. 
                                                       
6  For  example, this  was  the  case  in  2003 for  companies  like Caima,  Corticeira Amorim, 
Efacec, Mota-Engil, PT Multimédia or Sonaecom. 
7 Website: http://www.cmvm.pt   
8 Article 3, nr. 1, from CSC-Código das Sociedades Comerciais (Portuguese Company Law 
Code) states that “firms are regulated by the company law of the country where its main 
headquarters are situated and effective business administration takes place.”   18 
Given the above, our first step in our sampling procedures was to verify 
which companies were listed in Euronext Lisbon as of 31 December, 2003 in 
the  two  major  markets  (MCO-Mercado  de  Cotações  Oficiais  –  the  main 
market -, and Segundo Mercado - the so-called “second market”). We found a 
total of 57 companies, 50 of which were listed in the MCO, and 7 in the SM. 
Appendix 1 details the list of firms included in our sample and shows both the 
official and abbreviated names of these companies. 
In  the  case  of  two  financial  companies  in  our  initial  sample,  Banco 
Santander Central Hispano and Espírito Santo Financial Group we found that 
these  companies  were  subject  to  Spanish  and  Luxemburguese  laws, 
respectively.  For  this  reason,  these  firms  did  not  publish  a  corporate 
governance  report.  However,  even  if  this  was  not  the  case,  we  excluded 
financial companies from our sample, for reasons to be detailed further on.  
Another financial firm, Banco Comercial dos Açores, delisted after 31 
December 2003 following its acquisition by BANIF Comercial, SGPS so that 
no financial reports were available after that date (we would exclude this firm 
anyway for being a financial company). 
Financial  companies  were  excluded  due  to  their  regulatory  and 
accounting specificities.  Financial ratios, for instance, cannot be interpreted in 
the same way as those of other industries (Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2004). Also, 
corporate governance characteristics of financial companies are very much 
structured so as to have risk management as a corporate priority. According 
to  Peasnell  et  al.  (2000b),  financial  firms  are  subject  to  a  particular  legal 
environment  and  their  governance  mechanisms  are  substantially  different 
from those of other companies. For example, one of the major Portuguese 
banks, Banco BPI, created both credit and market risk executive committees, 
according to the information provided in the 2003 report. In addition, banks 
are  very  much  focused  on  meeting  financial  restrictions  imposed  by  bank 
regulators (in this case the Bank of Portugal).  
Two  listed  football  club  companies  (the  so-called  SAD-Sociedades 
Anónimas  Desportivas)  were  also  excluded  from  our  sample  since  the 
financial years applicable for these companies do not end, as is the case for 
the remaining listed firms, in December 31.   19 
In order to create a larger sample, we also collected data regarding the 
financial year 2002. Our final sample therefore includes 91 observations from 
46 different firms. According to our procedures, we only had one observation 
for  the  firm  Gescartão  given  that  we  only  found  its  corporate  governance 
report for 2003 since the firm’s shares were listed in the main market (MCO) 
only in that year. However, we obtained for this same firm all the necessary 
2002 auditing information from the firm’s listing prospectus and thus were able 
to avoid the loss of one observation. Such report was obtained from CMVM.  
Given the above, in the following analysis of the auditing reports the 
sample includes 46 firms and a total of 92 observations (two observations per 
firm),  while  for  the  remaining  analyses  we  have  45  companies  with  two 
observations for each and a single observation for the firm Gescartão for the 
reasons explained earlier.  
We  should  clarify  that  only  from  2002  onwards  are  corporate 
governance reports available so that, given the methodology and empirical 
model being used, we are not able to get a larger sample than the one used 
here.  
Our study, therefore, with the exception of financial and football club 
companies, for the reasons already explained, include all possible firms that 
are  subject  to  regulation  nr.  7/2001  (requirement  for  corporate  governance 
reports) in the years 2002 and 2003. 
Regarding the industry structure of our sample, and according to FTSE 
classification,  table  2  shows  the  distribution  of  firms  by  industry.  We  can 
observe that a total of 25 different industries are represented in the sample, 
the observations being quite dispersed among those industries. Nonetheless, 
the “Building Industry – Other”, “Paper” and “Computer Services” industries 
account for 34.8% of the total number of observations.  If one adds “Chemical 
Industries-Commodities”,  “Building  and  Building  Materials”  and  “Retailers-
Food and Drugs”, one finds that six industries (24% of the total number of 
sectors)  include  25  firms  (54.3%  of  the  total  number),  so  a  degree  of 
concentration in some industries is present.    20 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Auditing characteristics 
Table 3 shows the distribution of firms per auditor, a distinction being 
made between the so-called “Big 4” auditors and the remaining ones.  
It  can  be  observed  that  Big  4  auditors  are  responsible,  directly  or 
through subsidiaries, for about 70% of the audit reports in the two-year period 
(2002  and  2003).  Within  such  auditing  firms,  one  should  mention  the 
importance  of  Deloitte  accounting  for  45.7%  of  the  total  number  of  audit 
reports, although with a share that declined from 47.8% in 2002 to 43.5% in 
2003. Such large share is partly due to the fact that Andersen’s activities in 
Portugal were merged with Deloitte’s in 2002.  
It should also be mentioned that (i) one of the Big 4 (KPMG) does not 
show up in our sample
9, (ii) the residual importance in the sample of Ernst & 
Young (it was the auditor of a single company – SAG - during the two-year 
period),  and  (iii)  the  remaining  two  Big  4  (Deloitte  and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers) were responsible for more than two thirds of the 
total  number  of  observations,  i.e.,  63  auditing  reports  out  of  a  maximum 
possible total of 92. 
Among  the  non-Big  4,  two  of  these  are  subsidiaries  of  international 
firms - BDO and Grant Thornton — and are responsible for 4 and 3 audits, 
respectively, a larger sample presence than two of the Big 4 (Ernst & Young 
and KPMG). 
In  Table  4  we  record  the  distribution  of  audit  opinions  according  to 
whether these are “clean” or “modified” and by auditor type (Big 4 or not). One 
can observe that the number of firms that received modified opinions was the 
same  in  each  of  the  two  years  (24  firms),  but  the  modified  opinions  were 
redistributed during the two-year period as in 2003 the non-Big 4 increased 
the  number  of  modifications  (in  3  cases)  at  the  same  time  that  the  Big  4 
reduced theirs by the same number.  The number of clean opinions (22) was 
                                                       
9  In  an  information  report  filed  to  CMVM  in  September  17,  2004,  the  board  of  EDP-
Electricidade de Portugal, announced that it had agreed with KPMG Portugal, from October 
2004 onwards, the provision of external auditing services.   21 
stable during the whole period, and its distribution by auditor type also did not 
change in the same period. 
In relative terms, we can observe that either in 2002 or 2003, 24 out of 
46 firms (52%) have a modified opinion in the auditor’s report according to our 
criteria.  
From the 48 yearly observations which were categorized as having a 
modified opinion, in 31 instances a Big 4 was present (64.6%). This proportion 
is not very different from the market shares presented in Table 3.   
5.2. Board of directors 
From the analysis of corporate governance reports, we observed that 
a significant proportion of companies interpreted CMVM regulation nr.  7/2001 
(requirement for corporate governance reports) in a way that classified some 
members  as  independent  although  these  were  assigned  executive  roles. 
Given that such classification is not in line with the literature (e.g., Beasley, 
1996; Carcello et al., 2002), we considered these as non-independent, and 
restricted the independence status to situations where members of the board 
did  not  have  any  relationship  with  the  firm  apart  from  their  non-executive, 
supervising role. That situation was found in those cases where we observed 
that the percentage of non-executive members was lower than the proportion 
of members classified by the firm as independent. In 2003, we realized that 18 
firms (39%) recorded more independent members than non-executive ones. 
Table 5 provides a number of descriptive statistics on the board of 
directors. One can observe that the average board size is 7.29 members, with 
a minimum of 3 and maximum of 23. In comparative terms, Peasnell et al. 
(2004), report that in the UK the average board has 8 members. In the US, 
Xie  et  al.  (2003)  and  Klein  (2002a)  report  an  average  size  of  12.48  e  12 
members,  respectively.  Therefore,  it  is  clear  that  significant  size  difference 
exist between the average board size in our sample and that reported in the 
US or, to a lesser extent, UK studies.  
According  to  Portuguese  company  law,  the  board  of  directors  can 
appoint an executive committee whose role is to ensure the management of 
current  operations.  CMVM  requires  that  all  listed  firms  should  publish   22 
information on any executive committees which have been nominated by the 
board of directors
10. 
From the analysis of corporate governance reports, we conclude that 
the number of board meetings is usually lower when firms have appointed an 
executive committee, which suggests that a substitution effect is occurring. 
More precisely, the  average number of board meetings when an executive 
committee  is in place is  11.91, but that number reaches  15.69 when such 
committee does not exist, the difference being statistically significant (p-values 
of 0.086, assuming equal variances, or 0.055 when this is not assumed).    
The mean (median) number of board meetings in each year is 14.21 
(12) (minimum of 4 and maximum of 58) and the presence of an executive 
committee is observed in 36% of the sample (33 observations). Carcello et al. 
(2002) report a mean (median) of 7.54 (7) meetings while Abbott et al. (2003) 
documents a figure of 6.94 (6) meetings. 
From the statistics above, and assuming that board diligence can be 
proxied by the number of meetings, one could conclude that the typical board 
of directors of listed Portuguese firms is more diligent than the average board 
reported by the two studies referred above.  
For the reasons discussed earlier, PNEXEC is a variable measuring 
the  proportion  of  non-executive  members  according  to  the  classification 
published in company reports. We view here such variable as a proxy for the 
percentage of independent members. We acknowledge that this proxy can be 
biased as it may measure by excess the real number of independent directors 
                                                       
10 We can assess the roles assigned to this kind of committees and their activities by analyzing 
the  example  of    Jerónimo  Martins,  as  taken  from  this  firms’  2003  corporate  governance 
report: 
“The objective of the executive committee of the company is to assist the board of directors in 
its  management  functions.  As  a  body  delegated  by  the  Board,  it  is  up  to  the  executive 
committee, according to its statutory rules, the exercise of following functions:  definition of 
the strategic orientations of the Group, as well as the fundamental policies to be followed by 
its  subsidiaries;  controlling  the  implementation,  by  all  the  firms  in  the  Group,  of  those 
strategic orientations and policies; accounting and financial control of the Group and each of 
its firms; general coordination of the operating activities of the firms in the Group, regardless 
of their integration in business units or not; following the development of new ventures during 
their  launching  phase  until  the  full  integration  of  those  ventures  in  business  units; 
implementing a human resources policy for the senior executives of the Group. Throughout 
the year 2003 the executive committee met 36 times.”  
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as  some  non-executive  members  of  the  board  might  be  affiliated  with 
management. According to CMVM regulations it is up to the board of directors 
to  classify  any  of  its  members  as  independent  following  a  number  of 
guidelines loosely linked to FRC 2003 by CMVM. A non-executive member 
should be considered independent when no relationship with management, 
majority  shareholders  or  the  firm,  can  be  found  that  could  create  relevant 
conflicts of interest that might hamper an objective judgment from his part. 
Independence in this regard should be based on substance instead of form, 
although a number of situations exist that could limit the classification of a 
board member as independent (see FRC-Financial Reporting Council, 2003, 
recommendation A.3.1). 
The  mean  percentage  of  non-executive  members  is  35%,  with  26 
instances (28.5% of the sample) where all the members of the board have 
executive  roles.  Bearing  in  mind  CMVM’s  (2003)  recommendations  on  the 
corporate governance of listed firms, we can observe that for almost 30% of 
the  sample  the  CMVM  requirement  that  at  least  one  member  should  be 
regarded as independent, is not met in practice.  
In Xie et al. (2003) the mean percentage of external board members 
(non-executive and independent) is 67%. If one adds affiliated members (non-
executive and non-independent) to get a figure that could be comparable to 
ours,  the  overall  percentage  of  non-executive  totals  82%;  Klein  (2002a) 
reports a mean non-executive proportion of 77.5% (58.4% external and 19.1% 
affiliated),  while,  in  a  different  context  (the  UK),  Peasnell  et  al.  (2004) 
document a mean of 43% non-executive members. 
From  the  number  above  we  may  infer  the  existence  of  significant 
differences between the characteristics of the Portuguese board of directors 
and  the  ones  found  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  environment,  a  significantly  lower 
percentage of non-executive members being observed in Portugal.  
As in previous literature, (e.g., Klein, 2002a), we classify a board as 
independent when this is characterized by a majority (in excess of 50%) of 
non-executive members. Klein (2002a) reports that 73.8% of the boards in his 
sample  were  dominated  by  external  members  (independent  and  non-
executive).  In  our  study  such  proportion  drops  to  37%  (34  firm-year 
observations).   24 
The  extant  literature  (e.g.,  Beasley,  1996;  Peasnell  et  al.,  2004) 
commonly views CEO-Chairman duality (our variable DUAL) as an indicator 
for the internal power of the chairman in the board. Whenever the chairman 
has executive powers (i.e., is also the CEO), there is an increased probability 
of him dominating the board, hampering the independence of its members. 
Such power can materialize in the fact that the chairman has an overwhelming 
influence in the board’s structure and composition. According to the normative 
literature  (e.g.,  FRC,  2003;  OECD,  2004)  it  is  generally  considered  good 
practice  the  separation  between  chairman  and  CEO  roles.  Following  this 
perspective, chairmen are expected to oversee the efficiency of the board in 
all  relevant  dimensions,  including  setting  the  board’s  agenda,  providing 
adequate access by board members to all relevant information, and ensuring 
that  all  non-executive  members  have  all  the  necessary  conditions  to 
contribute  to  the  board’s  efficiency  and  proper  working.  One  of  the  major 
board objectives is to protect the relevant interests of the firm and maximize 
its  value  by  supervising  its  management.  This  includes  overseeing  the 
financial information production process. Such task is, therefore, one of the 
major  obligations  of  the  chairman,  in  conjunction  with  the  remaining  non-
executive members. 
In 73% of the observations in our sample, the chairman also plays an 
executive role. Peasnell et al. (2004) reports CEO-Chairman duality in 24% of 
cases in their UK sample. In the US, Xie et al. (2003) observe this in 85% of 
their sample firms. In this regard, Portugal’s reality is closer to that of the US 
than to the UK one.  
In what concerns the creation of audit committees, only in 8% of our 
sample were such entities appointed, all of which in 2003. This percentage is 
very  distant  from  the  one  reported  by  Peasnell  et  al.  (2004)  where  audit 
committees were found in 85% of cases or Dechow et al. (1996) who report a 
58%  proportion  in  firms  accused  by  the  SEC  of  manipulating  accounting 
numbers.  
 
5.3. Financial statistics 
In Table 6 descriptive statistics are presented on the set of accounting 
and  market  variables  for  our  sample.  In  terms  of  the  firm  size  variables   25 
(ASSETS, SALES and MKCAP), a significant presence of outliers is apparent 
(e.g.,  EDP,  Portugal  Telecom,  Sonae,  Brisa),  as  the  mean  is  substantially 
higher than the median. In relation to the ER variable, such difference is small, 
the  sample  only  experiencing  here  a  slight  positive  asymmetry.  Regarding 
ROA, one can observe a mean asset profitability of 3%, with more than 50% 
of  the  observations  exhibiting  profitability  ratios  lower  than  5%.  In  what 
concerns  growth  opportunities  (proxied  by  PBV),  our  results  show  that  the 
market prices firms’ equity at a mean (median) premium of 83% (28%) over its 
book value.  
5.4. Group comparisons and correlation matrix 
In  table  7  a  comparison  is  made  between  the  two  types  of  auditor 
opinions according to a number of different variables. The results point to the 
inexistence of significant differences between the two groups as far as board 
size (NUM) or the number of board meetings (MEET) are concerned. 
Regarding  the  percentage  of  non-executive  board  members 
(PNEXEC),  we  find that the mean  and median values for this variable  are 
lower  in  instances  where  a  modified  opinion  has  been  issued,  but  such 
difference  is  only  marginally  significant  (p-value  of  0.15).  However,  if  one 
considers a one-sided test – which is justifiable on the grounds that one would 
expect  a  larger  proportion  of  non-executive  members  in  the  clean  opinion 
group – the difference becomes statistically significant at the 10% level (p-
value<0.1). 
In terms of other factors that might conceivably influence the issuance 
by the auditor of a modified opinion, we can observe that the mean asset size 
(ASSETS)  is  larger  in  the  clean  opinion  group,  but  such  difference  is  not 
statistically significant in a non-parametric test. This result is understandable 
as one observes that the variable in question is strongly asymmetric and so 
can  hardly  be  approximated  by  a  normal  distribution.  We  can  therefore 
conclude that there are no significant differences between the two groups in 
terms of asset size.  
The same result does not apply to the equity-to-assets ratio (ER) or 
asset profitability (ROA) variables as the respective means observed for the 
clean  opinion  group  are  higher  than  those  observed  for  the  group  with  a   26 
modified  opinion,  the  difference  being  statistically  significant.  We  can 
therefore  conclude  that  clean  opinion  firms  enjoy  on  average  higher 
profitability and stronger equity ratios, in line with previous arguments. 
As far as growth opportunities are concerned, we find that the mean 
price-book value (PBV) of the clean opinion group is higher, but the difference 
is  not  significant  in  a  parametric  test.  However,  since  we  can  reject  the 
normality of this variable’s distribution (p-value<0.01), that difference becomes 
statistically significant when a non-parametric test is alternatively employed 
(p-value<0.10).   
Regarding  the  qualitative  explanatory  variables,  contingency  tables 
were prepared and a chi-squared (
2 c ) test was employed to verify whether 
such  variables  are  statistically  independent  from  the  audit  opinion  type. 
Results  are  presented  in  Table  8.  It  can  be  seen  that  the  presence  of  an 
executive committee (EC) is not independent from the audit opinion type (p-
value=0.028). Also, the fact that a firm reports net losses (LOSS) is also not 
statistically independent from the type of opinion being granted by the auditor 
(p-value<0.01). 
In the case of the CEO-chairman duality (DUAL), we cannot reject the 
hypothesis  that  this  variable  is  independent  from  the  type  of  audit  opinion 
being issued (p-value=0.67).     
In order to verify if multicollinearity problems were present, a correlation 
matrix is presented in table 9 for the quantitative explanatory variables. From 
this table we can observe that none of the correlations exceeds 60%. The 
highest correlation is that which is found for NUM and LASSETS. This might 
be due to a possible size effect. The evidence above suggests, therefore, the 
absence of severe multicollinearity problems in the variables in question
11.  
 
                                                       
11 More formal tests for the presence of multicollinearity in the regressions reported in the 
following sections confirm this conjecture. Following procedures defined by Belsley et al. 
(1980), we computed variance inflation factors (VIFs) that were observed to be always less 
than 2.5 on a scale where 10.0 represents a multicollinearity problem.   27 
5.5. Empirical model 
  Table 10 reports the logistic regression results, according to maximum 
likelihood estimation procedures
12. Considering model 5, we find that not only 
is the model’s adjustment quality as a whole significant (p-value<0.01), but 
also that the expected signs are generally present, at the same time that the 
model correctly predicts 86.81% of the observations. 
The model’s pseudo R
2 is 0.48. By comparison, when modelling the 
probability of a going-concern opinion being issued, Carcello and Neal (2000) 
obtain a pseudo R
2 of 0.51 while Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2004) get 0.229. 
A question that can be raised is whether the simultaneous introduction 
in the model of the explanatory variables associated with the characteristics of 
the board of directors significantly improves the model. Using a Wald test we 
concluded  that  the  inclusion  of  such  variables  is  indeed  a  significant 
improvement to the empirical specification (p-value of 0.07).  
Although the sign obtained is in accordance with a positive relationship 
between  the  number  of  board  members  (NUM)  and  the  probability  of  a 
modified opinion being issued, this is not statistically significant at either the 
5% or 10% levels, leading us to conclude that board size seems to have no 
influence on the type of audit opinion. This contradicts evidence by Beasley 
(1996),  who  finds  that  board  size  is  positively  related  to  the  likelihood  of 
accounting fraud. We can therefore conclude that our evidence rejects H1.  
Board  diligence  (proxied  by  our  variables  MEET  and  EC)  has  an 
influence  on  the  auditor’s  opinion  type  which  is  signed  as  expected  but 
significant only for the variable accounting for the existence of an executive 
committee (p-value<0.05). The evidence, therefore, leads us to accept H2 for 
this variable only. If, in line with former literature (e.g., Carcello et al., 2002), 
MEET is the only proxy for board diligence, still this variable is not significant 
                                                       
12 In an unreported additional sensitivity analysis, we redefined the dependent variable OPIN 
by assigning to it a value of 1 if the financial statements received two or more comments from 
auditors. Using such transformed variable, the explanatory variables EC and PNEXEC are no 
longer statistically significant. This might be caused by the fact that the relevant threshold 
may  be  the  inexistence  of  any  comment  (their  precise  number  being  of  secondary 
importance). In other words, the existence of an executive committee and the proportion of 
non-executive board members would have an influence on whether the company is issued any 
comment  leading  to  an  audit  modification.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  only  in  23   28 
(p-value=0.34), at the same time that the remaining results from the model are 
virtually unchanged. We may therefore conclude that in the Portuguese case 
our evidence suggests that the existence of an executive committee (EC) is a 
good proxy for board diligence, but the same does not seem to apply to the 
number of board meetings (MEET).  
Board independence (proxied by our variables PNEXEC and DUAL) is 
also  a  significant  influence  on  the  type  of  audit  opinion  issued,  with  the 
expected negative and significant sign being found only for the proportion of 
non-executive members (p-value<0.05). Our evidence is thus in agreement 
with the proposition that the larger the percentage of non-executive members 
in the board the lower the probability that the firm will be issued a modified 
opinion  by  the  auditor.  In  contrast,  duality  does  not  seem  to  affect  the 
likelihood  of  a  modified  opinion  (p-value=0.31).  These  results  are  in 
accordance,  therefore,  with  H3  only  when  we  use  as  proxy  for  board 
independence the percentage of non-executive members. 
Regarding control variables, only for the firm size variable (LASSETS) 
can we reject the hypothesis that this influences the type of audit opinion (p-
value>0.10).  Additional  tests  using  sales  or  market  capitalization  as 
alternative proxies for firm size yielded very similar results.  
Our results show that the existence of consecutive losses (LOSS) has 
the expected positive impact on the likelihood of a modified audit opinion. Also 
in  accordance  with  expectations,  a  larger  equity  ratio  (ER)  has  a  negative 
influence on the probability that the auditor issues a modified opinion. The 
same  applies  as  well  to  asset  profitability  (ROA),  our  measure  of  firm 
performance.  All  of  these  variables  are  therefore  signed  as  expected  and 
statistically significant (p-value<0.05)
13. 
Finally, our findings also reveal that the larger the price-to-book value 
(PBV) (our proxy for growth opportunities), the lower are the chances that the 
firm will be issued a modified opinion (p-value<0.05). This suggests that such 
                                                                                                                                                         
observations (25%) were two or more audit comments recorded may be causing an influence 
on these results.  
13 If the variable LOSS is redefined by assigning to it a value of 1 if the company reports 
negative current income for at least the two last years, and 0 otherwise, the results remain 
very similar. Also, when we redefine ROA as net income divided by total net assets, still no 
relevant changes in the results are found.    29 
companies are deeply interested in ensuring that their financial statements will 
not be modified by auditors so as to maintain a good reputation in the capital 
markets in terms of the quality of its financial reporting.   
Generally  speaking,  the  above  results  are  consistent  with  firms 
characterized  by  financial  or  growth  difficulties  being  more  engaged  in 
adopting  aggressive  accounting  options  attempting  to  convey  a  more 
favourable  image  of  their  financial  position  or  performance.  The  auditors, 
however, given most likely the larger litigation risks they face in those clients, 
try to insulate themselves from such risks by issuing modified audit opinions. 
6. Robustness checks 
 
In this section we analyze the possibility that some other factors may 
account  for  the  results  presented  earlier  as  well  as  their  robustness  to 
different  variable  definitions.  Table  11  reports  the  results  obtained  for  a 
number of different specifications.   
6.1. Qualified opinions 
In model 1 we redefined the dependent variable as follows:  
QOPIN  =  1,  if  a  firm  has  been  issued  a  qualified  opinion  (i.e., 
qualifications only), and 0 otherwise. 
The reasoning for this redefinition relates to the fact that information 
users may lend greater importance to an opinion which has been qualified by 
the  auditor  as  the  result  of  one  or  more  qualifications  rather  than  mere 
emphases.  In  agreement  with  such  perspective,  CMVM,  the  exchange 
commission, seems to consider the existence of qualifications a particularly 
important issue since that in its analysis of audit reports for listed companies it 
only took in consideration the existence of qualified opinions, ignoring thus all 
emphases
14. 
Of  the  91  observations  in  our  sample  29  (32%)  corresponded  to 
qualified  opinions  redefined  as  explained  above.  The  regression  results, 
however, are still globally significant, albeit with a lower pseudo-R
2 (0.39). The 
existence  of  an  executive  committee  (proxy  for  board  diligence)  and  the   30 
percentage of non-executive board members remain statistically significant in 
the regression (p-value<0.05) and with the expected sign. Board size is still an 
insignificant influence on the audit opinion type.  
An  interesting  result  relates  to  the  unexpected  significant  negative 
impact  of  CEO-Chairman  duality  (DUAL)  on  the  likelihood  of  a  qualified 
opinion (p-value<0.1). A possible explanation for this is the potential negative 
impact of such duality on the auditor’s independence. This in turn may be an 
incentive for the auditor to be ever more cautious in his work so as to avoid 
any suspicions of lack of independence. Our overall results in this matter thus 
suggest  that  duality  is  a  negative  influence  on  the  probability  of  a  firm 
receiving a qualified opinion but not when we consider, instead, a modified 
opinion (i.e., qualifications and/or emphases). 
6.2. Auditor type 
In  the  context  of  our  research,  the  hypothesis  that  auditor  size 
increases audit quality is tested by introducing in model 2 the variable BIG 4 
that takes the value of 1 whenever the auditor is one of the largest auditing 
firms, and 0 otherwise. Results show that the fact that the audit report was 
issued by a Big 4 auditor has a positive impact on the audit opinion type but 
not at statistically significant levels (p-value=0.54). Therefore, such variable 
does not add much explanatory power to our model. 
                                                                                                                                                         
14 In http://www.cmvm.pt a statistical analysis undertaken by CMVM is available where it can 
be seen that no references whatsoever are made regarding audit emphases.   31 
6.3. Dividend payments 
In model 3 the variable DIVBI was introduced, assuming a value of 1 if 
the company paid dividends in the year in question, or 0 otherwise.   
From the analysis of corporate governance reports (in the section that 
addresses  dividend  policy),  we  observe  that  under  certain  circumstances 
companies suspend their dividend payments usually with the allegation that 
they are facing temporary accounting profit difficulties (usually losses) or large 
investments (e.g., Impresa or Sonae Indústria in 2003). It is thus reasonable 
to  assume  the  possibility  that  dividend  payments  may  influence  the  audit 
opinion  as  the  dividend  decision  is  an  important  information  regarding  the 
availability, in practice, of distributable funds to shareholders.  Therefore, the 
cancellation of dividend payments might be associated to liquidity problems or 
debt covenants, both of which may turn out to be relevant considerations for 
the auditor to assess the applicability of a going-concern principle (ISA 570). 
We would therefore anticipate a negative impact of dividend payments on the 
probability that a modified opinion is issued by the auditor.  
In our sample we find that dividend payments occurred in 38 (41.8%) 
observations. When testing the hypothesis that these influence the auditor’s 
opinion our  evidence reveals that dividend payments do in fact reduce the 
probability of a firm receiving an audit modification (p-value<0.05), confirming 
our perception that liquidity considerations associated with dividend decisions 
are an important consideration in this context. 
Finally,  for  the  remaining  variables  in  this  model,  there  are  no 
significant changes as compared to the results in the initial specification.  
6.4. Independent majority in the board 
A potentially important concern in the issue of the influence of board of 
directors’  characteristics  on  the  audit  opinion  is  the  percentage  of  non-
executive members, and whether, in particular, a majority of these is present 
or not. According to the Portuguese Law, the preparation of financial reports is 
exclusively the board’s responsibility and decisions are taken according to the 
rule of majority voting [see articles 406, d), and 410, nr.7, of the CSC - Código 
das Sociedades Comerciais, the Portuguese Company Law Code].    32 
Klein (2002a) finds evidence that a majority of independent members 
has a negative impact on earnings management activities, with the evidence 
being  weaker  when  only  the  proportion  of  non-executive  members  is 
considered. 
Following a similar reasoning, we redefined the variable PNEXEC in 
the following manner: 
NEXEC51 takes the value of 1 when the percentage of non-executive 
members is greater than 50%, and 0 otherwise. 
In 91 observations of our sample we find that in 57 (62.6%) boards the 
number of non-executive members is less than 50%.  
Finally,  from  the  results  reported  for  model  4,  we  can  see  that  the 
variable  NEXEC51  has  a  negative  impact  on  the  probability  of  a  modified 
audit opinion (p-value=0.03), just like PNEXEC in the initial model.  
A  possible  interpretation  for  our  results  is  that  when  the  majority  of 
board members are independent, the board will tend to back more often the 
auditor’s perspective, therefore avoiding the existence of audit modifications
15.   
7. Conclusions, limitations and future research directions 
 
In  this  paper  we  analyze,  within  the  Portuguese  context,  the 
relationship between board of directors’ characteristics and the probability that 
a  firm  is  issued  a  modified  audit  opinion.  We  find  evidence  that  board 
diligence and independence have a negative impact on the likelihood of the 
firm  facing  an  audit  modification,  the  results  being  robust  to  a  number  of 
alternative  model  specifications  and  variable  definitions.  Regarding  board 
size,  we  did  not  find  evidence  of  a  significant  influence.  Other  factors, 
however, that proved to be statistically significant in determining the type of 
audit  opinion  being  received  were  the  firm’s  financial  health,  performance, 
growth opportunities and the existence of dividend payments.  
The  evidence  reported  in  this  paper  is  also  in  accordance  with  a 
number of concerns that have been expressed by several international bodies 
                                                       
15 In an unreported regression, we also analyzed if some industry effects were present that 
could  alter  our  conclusions.  Specifically,  we  included  a  dummy  variable  for  an  industry 
(“Building”) where according to some financial analysts accounting information is allegedly   33 
(e.g.,  FRC,  2003;  OECD,  2004).  These  have  drawn  the  attention  for  the 
relation between financial reporting quality and board structure, namely the 
potential importance of independent non-executive members that could help 
to ensure the integrity of financial reports.  
In  this  study  we  acknowledge  that  our  classification  of  independent 
board members is an imperfect one, as information needed to more rigorously 
classify board members in that dimension is not available in Portugal. Another 
related limitation is that we could not find information on the level of formal 
training  or  professional  knowledge  in  accounting  or  auditing  issues  that 
characterizes  each  board  member,  thus  leaving  the  possibility  of  omitted 
variable biases in the analysis. 
A  further  limitation  is  the  fact  that  we  do  not  have  data  on  the 
accounting adjustments that were accepted by the firm, nor the actual areas 
where  greater  disagreements  with  auditors  existed,  or  the  role  of  non-
executives in settling those disputes (e.g., DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). In this 
paper we explicitly assume that if a disagreement arises, the non-executives 
are  expected  to  support  the  auditor’s  perspective  so  that  if  a  majority  of 
independent members is present, financial reports will be less subject to audit 
modifications.   
Regarding  the  issue  of  non-audit  fees,  recent  regulation  issued  by 
CMVM (nr. 11/2003) imposes on firms the duty to disclose the amounts of 
such fees paid to their auditors in each year. Therefore, since such data was 
not available for 2002 and 2003, future research might analysis whether such 
consideration changes the results in this paper (e.g., Frankel et al. (2002) and 
Defond et al. (2002) find that this may have an impact on the type of audit 
opinion and on the existence of earnings management activities). 
A final unexplored issue in this paper is the analysis of whether the 
professional qualification or experience, in accounting or finance fields, of the 
board  members  in  our  sample  has  an  impact  on  the  quality  of  published 
accounting  information  (e.g.,  Agrawal  and  Chadha,  2005).  We  could  not 
address  this  problem  given  the  lack  of  information  on  that  regard  on  the 
                                                                                                                                                         
more  opaque  in  Portugal.  Results  were  virtually  unchanged  and  the  dummy  itself  was 
statistically insignificant.   34 
corporate governance reports of listed firms in Portugal. This is also best left 
for future research. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, our paper contributes to the literature in 
a novel way by showing that previous research that documented the impact of 
board characteristics on the quality of accounting information can be extended 
to  an  additional  dimension  of  accounting  quality,  the  existence  of  audit 
modifications.  We  are  able  to  analyze  this  feature  in  the  Portuguese 
Exchange given that, in contrast with larger markets such as the US, listed 
companies are not required to publish GAAP complying accounts. In addition, 
the paper also extends the research on board structure and accounting quality 
to an emerging market environment for which few studies have been made. 
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APPENDIX 1  – LISTED FIRMS IN THE  INITIAL SAMPLE 
(MCO-Mercado de Cotações Oficiais (“main market”);  
SM-Segundo Mercado (“second market”)) 
  OFFICIAL NAME  ABBREVIATED NAME  MARKET 
1  Brisa —Auto Estradas de Portugal, SA  Brisa  MCO 
2  Celulose do Caima, SGPS, SA  Caima  MCO 
3  Cimpor —Cimentos de Portugal, SGPS, SA Cimpor  MCO 
4  CIN—Corporação Industrial do Norte, SA  CIN  MCO 
5 
Cofaco—Comercial e Fabril de Conservas, 
SA  Cofaco  SM 
6  Cofina —SGPS, SA  Cofina  MCO 
7 
Comp. Industrial Resinas Sintéticas - Cires, 
SA  Cires  MCO 
8 
Compta —Equipamentos e Serviços de 
Informática, SA  Compta  MCO 
9  Conduril —Construtora Duriense, SA  Conduril  SM 
10 
Copam—Companhia Portuguesa de 
Amidos, SA  Copam  SM 
11  Corticeira Amorim—SGPS, SA   Corticeira Amorim  MCO 
12  EDP—Electricidade de Portugal, SA  EDP  MCO 
13  Efacec Capital, SGPS, SA  Efacec  MCO 
14  Estoril Sol, SGPS, SA  Estoril Sol  MCO 
15  Fisipe—Fibras Sintéticas de Portugal, SA  Fisipe  MCO 
16  Gescartão, SGPS, SA  Gescartão  MCO 
17  Grupo Soares da Costa, SGPS, SA  Soares da Costa  MCO 
18  Ibersol —SGPS, SA  Ibersol  MCO 
19  Imobiliária Construtora Grão Pará, SA  Grão Pará  MCO 
20  Impresa, SGPS, SA  Impresa  MCO 
21 
INAPA—Investimentos, Participações e 
Gestão, SA  Inapa  MCO 
22  Jerónimo Martins—SGPS, SA  Jerónimo Martins  MCO 
23  Lisgráfica—Impressão e Artes Gráficas, SA Lisgráfica  MCO 
24 
Litho Formas Portuguesa—Impre. Cont. e 
Mult., SA  Litho  SM 
25  Modelo Continente, SGPS, SA  Modelo Continente  MCO   36 
26  Mota—Engil, SGPS, SA  Mota–Engil  MCO 
27  Novabase, SGPS, SA  Novabase  MCO 
28 
Papelaria Fernandes—Industria e 
Comércio, SA  Papelaria Fernandes  MCO 
29  Pararede—SGPS, SA  Pararede  MCO 
30 
Portucel—Empresa Produtora de Pasta de 
papel, SA  Portucel  MCO 
31  Portugal Telecom, SGPS, SA  Portugal Telecom  MCO 
32 
PT Multimédia—Serv. Tel. Multimédia, 
SGPS, SA  PT Multimédia  MCO 
33  Reditus, SGPS, SA  Reditus  MCO 
34 
SAG Gest—Soluções Automóveis Globais, 
SGPS, SA  SAG  MCO 
35 
Salvador Caetano—Indust. Metal. Veículos 
Transp, SA  Salvador Caetano  MCO 
36 
Semapa—Sociedade Investimentos e 
Gestão, SGPS, SA  Semapa   MCO 
37  Sociedade Comercial Orey Antunes, SA  Orey Antunes  MCO 
38  Sociedade Têxtil Amieiros Verdes, SA  Amieiros Verdes  SM 
39  Somague, SGPS, SA  Somague  MCO 
40  Sonae—SGPS, SA  Sonae SGPS  MCO 
41  Sonae Industria - SGPS, SA  Sonae Industria   MCO 
42  Sonaecom—SGPS, SA  Sonaecom  MCO 
43 
Sumolis—Comp. Industrial de Frutas e 
Bebidas, SA  Sumolis  MCO 
44 
Teixeira Duarte—Engenharia e 
Construções, SA  Teixeira Duarte  MCO 
45  Tertir—Terminais de Portugal, SA  Tertir  MCO 
46  VAA—Vista Alegre Atlantis—SGPS, SA  VAA  MCO 
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Description  Number 
Companies listed in Euronext Lisbon in 2003  57 
Less: firms not subject to Portuguese Law  2 
Less:  firms  without  financial  reports  available  for  2003  (31 
December)  
1 
Less: financial firms  6 
Less: Sociedades Anónimas Desportivas (Football club firms)  2 
Final number of firms in the sample  46 
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Table 2 
Sample Industry Distribution 
Code  Industry  Nr.  % 
113  Chemical Industries—Commodities  3  6,52
132  Building and  Building Materials   3  6,52
137  Building — Other  6  13,04
156  Paper  6  13,04
252  Electrical Equipment  1  2,17
263  Commercial Vehicles and Trucks  1  2,17
318  Retail – Vehicles  1  2,17
345 
Domestic appliances and Domestic Use 
Articles  1  2,17
349  Other Textile and Leather Products  1  2,17
416  Drinks—Distilleries and Wine Producers  1  2,17
418  Soft Drinks  1  2,17
433  Agriculture and Fisheries  1  2,17
435  Food Manufacturing  1  2,17
532  Gambling  1  2,17
539  Restaurants and Bars  1  2,17
542  Television and Radio—Suppliers  1  2,17
543  Cable and Satellite  1  2,17
547  Editing and Printing  2  4,35
596  Rail, Road and Cargo Transports  1  2,17
597  Maritime/River Transports and Harbours  2  4,35
630  Retailers—Food and Drugs  3  6,52
673  Fixed LineTelecommunications  1  2,17
678  Mobile Telecommunications  1  2,17
720  Electricity  1  2,17
972  Computer Services  4  8,70
   Total  46  100,00
Note:  The  industry  classification  for  each  firm  was  obtained  directly  from 
Euronext Lisbon’s website (www.euronext.pt) 53 
Table 3 
Distribution of sample firms by auditor 
2002  2003  Total 
Auditor  N  %  N  %  N  % 
Deloitte  22  47,8  20  43,5  42  45,7 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  11  23,9  10  21,7  21  22,8 
Ernst & Young  1  2,2  1  2,2  2  2,2 
Other  12  26,1  15  32,6  27  29,3 




Distribution of auditors’ opinions by category 
   2002  2003 
  
2002/2003 
   Big 4  Non-Big 4  TOTAL  Big 4  Non-Big 4  TOTAL  Big 4  Non-Big 4  TOTAL 
Clean  17  5  22  17  5  22  34  10  44 
Modified  17  7  24  14  10  24  31  17  48 












Quantitative             
          NUM  7.29  3.34  5  7  9  3-23 
          MEET  14.32  10.10  7  12  16  4-58 
          PNEXEC  0.35  0.27  0  0.36  0.57  0-0.86 
Qualitative 
(a)             
          NEXEC51  0.37 
(34)           
          DUAL  0.73 
(66)           
          EC  0.36 
(33)           
          AUDC  0.08 
(7)           
Notes:             
The sample includes 91 year-firm observations in the period 2002-2003; 
NUM = number of board members; 
MEET = total number of board meetings in each year; 
PNEXEC = proportion of non-executive members in the board; 
NEXEC51 = 1 if the proportion of non-executive members in the board exceeds 
50%, 0 otherwise; 
DUAL = 1 if the Chairman of the Board and the CEO are the same person, 0 
otherwise; 
EC = 1 if an executive committee is reported at year-end; 0 otherwise; 
AUDC = 1 if an audit committee is reported at year-end, 0 otherwise; 
(a) In qualitative variables, the numbers in brackets refer to the sum, that is, the 
number of instances where the characteristic in question was observed. 
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Table 6 
Accounting and market variables 
Variable  Mean  Std. 
Deviation 
1st 
Quartile  Median  3rd 
Quartile  Min.  Max. 
ASSETS  1.541.808  3.460.296  100.206  330.571  1.225.485  6.200  18.650.669 
SALES  891.480  1.617.383  49.097  216.583  813.695  3.410  6.977.520 
MKCAP  675.978  1.640.323  12.150  109.382  355.213  525  10.009.190 
ER  0.27  0.19  0.15  0.24  0.38  -0.21  0.82 
ROA  0.03  0.08  0.01  0.03  0.07  -0.35  0.34 
PBV  1.83  2.06  0.68  1.28  2.26  -0.07  14.41 
Notas:     
ASSETS = Total assets, in thousands of euros;     
SALES = Total sales, in thousands of euros;     
MKCAP = Market capitalization of firm equity,  in thousands of euros; 
ER = Equity ratio, computed as the ratio between book equity and total assets; 
ROA = Asset profitability, computed as earnings before interest, taxes and 
extraordinary items divided by total assets; 
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Table  7 








(n = 47)  (n = 44)  (modified – 
clean)  p-value  p-value 
6.91  7.68  -0.77  NUM 
(7.00)  (7.00)  (0.00) 
0.28  0.51 
14.38  14.25  0.13  MEET 
(12.00)  (12.00)  (0.00) 
0.95  0.95 
0.31  0.39  -0.08  PNEXEC 
(0.29)  (0.40)  (-0.11) 
0.15  0.16 
852492  2278122  -1425629  ASSETS   
(243033)  (351247)  (108214) 
0.06  0.28 
0.21  0.34  -0.13  ER   
(0.18)  (0.31)  (-0.13) 
0.00  0.00 
-0.00  0.07  -0.07  ROA 
(0.02)  (0.06)  (-0.04) 
0.00  0.00 
1.66  2.02  -0.36  PBV 
(1.19)  (1,71)  (-0.52) 
0.41  0.06 
The levels of significance shown relate to two-sided tests; 
Given that we rejected the hypothesis of normal distribution for the variables, a 
Mann-Whitney  U  non-parametric  test  was  used  to  verify  if  the  two  groups 
relate to populations with the same location.   
NUM = number of board members; 
MEET = total number of board meetings in each year; 
PNEXEC = proportion of non-executive members in the board; 
ASSETS = total assets, in thousands of euros;  
ER = Equity ratio, computed as the ratio between book equity and total assets; 
ROA  =  Asset  profitability,  computed  as  earnings  before  interest,  taxes  and 
extraordinary items divided by total assets; 
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Table 8 
Distribution of qualitative variables according to audit opinion type (clean = 44, 
qualified = 47) 
  EC  DUAL  LOSS 
  p-value = 0.028  p-value = 0.67  p-value = 0.00 
Type of 
audit 
opinion  Existing 
Non-









Clean  21  23  31  13  3  41 
Modified  12  35  35  12  21  26 
Notes: 
EC = 1 if an executive committee is reported at year-end; 0 otherwise; 
DUAL = 1 if the Chairman of the Board and the CEO are the same person, 0 otherwise; 
LOSS = 1, if a firm reports net losses in the last two years, 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 9 
Pearson and Spearman correlation matrixes 
   NUM  MEET  PNEXEC  LASSETS  ER  ROA  PBV 
NUM  1  -0.21*  0.32**  0.56**  -0.06  0.02  0.21* 
MEET  -0.29**  1  -0.49**  0.07  0.09  0.03  -0.21* 
PNEXEC  0.28**  -0.43**  1  0.05  -0.17  -0.07  0.20 
LASSETS  0.52**  -0.04  0.00  1  -0.32**  0.20  0.19 
ER  -0.08  -0.03  -0.15  -0.25*  1  0.26**  -0.20 
ROA  0.07  0.07  -0.08  0.24**  0.24*  1  -0.11 
PBV  0.34**  -0.16  0.15  0.33**  -0.21*  0.35**  1 
Notes: 
Pearson correlations above the main diagonal, and Spearman correlations below.  
* and ** indicate significant correlations at the 5% or 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
NUM = number of board members; 
MEET = total number of board meetings in each year; 
PNEXEC = proportion of non-executive members in the board; 
ASSETS = total assets, in thousands of euros; 
ER = Equity ratio, computed as the ratio between book equity and total assets; 
ROA = Asset profitability, computed as earnings before taxes and extraordinary items 
divided by total assets; 
PBV = price book value.   58 
 
Table 10 
Logistic regression results 
 
   
                   
                     
                     
                     





(p-value)    
Coefficient 
(p-value)    
Coefficient 
(p-value)    
Coefficient 
(p-value)    
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Constant  ?  0.63    0.62    -2.51    -0.36    -2.06 
    (0.82)    (0.82)    (0.43)    (0.91)    (0.60) 
NUM  ?  -0.04    -0.04    -0.00    0.07    0.08 
    (0.73)    (0.75)    (0.99)    (0.63)    (0.59) 
MEET  -      0.00    -0.00    -0.04    -0.03 
        (0.96)    (0.96)    (0.28)    (0.32) 
EC  -          -2.10    -2.03    -2.16 
            (0.01)    (0.02)    (0.01) 
PNEXEC  -              -3.53    -3.14 
                (0.02)    (0.05) 
DUAL  +                  0.86 
                    (0.31) 
LASSETS  ?  0.16    0.16    0.41    0.37    0.44 
    (0.48)    (0.49)    (0.13)    (0.20)    (0.15) 
LOSS  +  2.11    2.11    2.87    3.07    3.33 
    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.00) 
                     
)
( ) 1 ( Pr
10 9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1
e b b b b b
b b b b b a
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(p-value)    
Coefficient 
(p-value)    
Coefficient 
(p-value)    
Coefficient 
(p-value)    
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
ER  -  -6.19    -6.21    -5.63    -7.18    -7.19 
    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.01) 
ROA  -  -17.92    -17.89    -17.43    -18.92    -20.22 
    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03) 
PBV  ?  -0.34    -0.34    -0.27    -0.29    -0.30 
    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.11)    (0.10)    (0.09) 
                     
N=91; Clean=44; Modified=47                     
Chi-Square for Model    45.61    45.61    53.47    59.59    60.65 
p-value    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
Pseudo R
2     0.36    0.36    0.42    0.47    0.48 
Correct classifications (cut-off = 0.5)  80.22%     80.22%     85.71%     85.71%     86,81% 
Notes:                               
The dependent variable is the auditor opinion, assuming the value of 1 when it is modified, 0 otherwise.     
NUM = number of board members;                   
MEET = total number of board meetings in each year;             
EC = 1 if an executive committee is reported at year-end; 0 otherwise;         
PNEXEC = proportion of non-executive members in the board;         
DUAL = 1 if the Chairman of the Board and the CEO are the same person, 0 otherwise;         
LASSETS = log of total assets;                      
LOSS = 1, if firm reports net losses for at least two consecutive years, 0 otherwise;         
ER = Equity ratio, computed as the ratio between book equity and total assets ;       
ROA = Asset profitability, computed as earnings before interest, taxes and extraordinary items divided by total assets; 
PBV = price book value.                       60 
Table 11 
Additional regressions 
















0.86  -1.90  -1.27  -2.68  Constant  ? 
(0.81)  (0.63)  (0.77)  (0.50) 
-0.04  0.08  0.12  0.10  NUM  ? 
(0.79)  (0.57)  (0.45)  (0.49) 
-0.01  -0.03  -0.04  -0.02  MEET  - 
(0.77)  (0.47)  (0.32)  (0.47) 
-1.98  -2.30  -1.98  -2.28  EC  - 
(0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
-2.96  -3.06  -4.48  PNEXEC  - 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.01) 
 
-1.47  0.93  0.84  1.04  DUAL  + 
(0.09)  (0.28)  (0.35)  (0.22) 
0.29  0.39  0.50  0.42  LASSETS  ? 
(0.29)  (0.21)  (0.14)  (0.18) 
1.65  3.51  2.94  3.32  LOSS  + 
(0.07)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00) 
-7.02  -7.56  8.76  7.20  ER  - 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
-0.62  -20.99  -17.27  -23.64  ROA  - 
(0.94)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.02) 
-0.65  -0.32  -0.39  -0.28  PBV  ? 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.12) 
0.56  BIG4  +   
(0.54) 
   
-1.89  DIVBI  -     
(0.03) 
 
-1.84  NEXEC51  -       
(0.03) 
N = 91 
Chi-Square for Model  44.87  61.04  66.13  61.75 
Pseudo R
2  0.39  0.48  0,52  0.49 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
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Table 11 (continued) 
Notes: 
In model 1 the dependent variable was redefined by assigning it a 
value  of  1  if  a  qualified  opinion  was  issued  (as  the  result  of 
disagreement and/or scope limitation), 0 in the opposite case. In the 
remaining  models  OPIN=1  if  qualifications  or  emphases  were 
recorded whatsoever, 0 in the opposite case.  
NUM = number of board members; 
MEET = total number of board meetings in each year; 
EC = 1 if an executive committee is reported at year-end; 0 if not; 
PNEXEC = proportion of non-executive members in the board; 
DUAL = 1 if the Chairman of the Board and the CEO are the same 
person, 0 if not; 
LASSETS = log of total assets, in thousands of euros; 
LOSS = 1, if firm reports net losses for at least two consecutive 
years, 0 if not; 
ER = Equity ratio, computed as the ratio between book equity and 
total assets ; 
ROA = Asset profitability, computed as earnings before interest, 
taxes and extraordinary items divided by total assets; 
PBV = price book value;  
BIG4 = 1, if the audit report was issued by one of the four largest 
international audit firms, 0 in the opposite case; 
DIVBI = 1, if the company distributed dividends in the year, 0 if not; 
NEXEC51 = 1, if the proportion of non-executive members exceeds 
50%, 0 if this is not the case. 
 
 